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We begin this research with the belief that low and declining levels of private-employer sponsored
health insurance were a continuing problem, especially among less skilled workers.  Our analysis, however,
paints a more complex picture. Using data from the March CPS, the SIP, and CPS benefits surveys, we
find that while many less skilled workers remain uncovered, the decline in private employer-sponsored
health insurance coverage has slowed recently and may even have reversed.
Neither crowdout nor a deterioration in the quality of jobs available to the less skilled seems likely
to fully explain these time-series trends in health insurance coverage.  A simple explanation that has been
largely overlooked is that rising health care costs have driven much of the reduction in private insurance
coverage, but it is more difficult to test this hypothesis given the available data.
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Most non-elderly Americans get their health insurancethrough
either their own employment, or the employment offamily members.
Thus, evidence that rates of private health insurancecoverage have
fallen over time have caused great concern. Forexample, Table 1
(from Farber and Levy (1998) Table 13) shows that thefraction of
private sector workers aged 20 to 65 who were coveredby their own
employer's insurance fell from 72 to 65% between 1979 and1997.
The decline was much more dramaticamong workers without a high
school education; among these workerscoverage fell from 67 to 50%.
A closer inspection of Table 1 suggests however,that the
decline in private health insurancecoverage slowed to a halt
between 1993 and 1997. This paper provides additionalconfirmation
of this finding. Using data from three differentsources, we find
that in contrast to the preceding two decades,there has been
little overall decline in private health insurancecoverage in the
1990s. This finding holds even for less-educatedsingle mothers,
a group of particular concern to policy makers in thisera of
welfare reform.
The paper begins with some theoreticalconsiderations
regarding the reasons why health insurance is providedby
employers. We continue with an overview of the available data for
the period 1987 to 1997, and with a discussion oftrends in health
insurance coverage over that period.Finally, we offer some
observations about three hypotheses whichmay be used to explain
the earlier decline in health insurancecoverage, as well as the
1r,aijon ror eltrier the decline or its
reversal, we conclude that neither the crowding out ofprivate
insurance by public insurance, nor a worsening injob "quality" are
likely to be complete explanations.it seems more likely that
trends in health care costs underlie thepatterns we see, though
the data necessary for a definitive test of thishypothesis is
lacking.
1. Theoretical Considerations
Before discussing the trends in employer-sponsoredhealth
insurance, it is helpful to ask why most Americansare covered by
employer-sponsored policies to begin with.' The mainreason that
most workers purchase health insurance through theiremployers is
likely to be that employers are able to offer insurance ata lower
cost than employees can purchase it in the market. Given thiscost
advantage, employer-sponsored health insurance can makeemployees
better off,even if employers do not offer the optimal
wage/benefits bundle for each employee.
There are several reasons for employers' costadvantage.
First, a 1943 internal Revenue Service ruling madecompensation in
the form of health insurance (and pensions) excludablefrom taxable
income,in contrast, an employee who purchased an individual
1Thisdiscussion is drawn from Currie and Madrian (1998).
2policy would be taxed on the income used topay for it.2 Gruber
and Poterba (1996) calculate that the tax-inducedreduction in the
uprice! of employer-provided health insuranceaverages about 27%.
A second factor creating a wedge betweenemployee and employer
costs is selection into the labor force.Poor health increases
medical costs and reduces the probability ofemployment. Thus, the
employed are likely to be healthier and cost less to insure than
the unemployed. Moreover, large groups can reduce adverse
selection and lower administrative expenses throughpooling. These
two factors can reduce the cost of providing healthinsurance in
large firms relative to small firms by as muchas 35%
(Congressional Research Service, 1988)
This simple cost-based model of employer-sponsoredhealth
insurance suggests several reasons why not allworkers will be
covered by their own employer-sponsored insurance, andwhy less
skilled workers will be the least likely to be insured:
a) If health insurance is a normal good thenpoor people will
demand less of it. In the event of medicalcatastrophe, indigent
care exists even for those who are not insured. Thus, what health
insurance buys is routine well care and betterquality sick care.
Lower income people may forgo these as luxuries. Interms of the
tradeoff between wages and health benefits, theyare at an all
wages" corner solution.
2 Although expenditureson insurance and medical expenses in
excess of 7.5% of adjusted gross income are tax deductible.
3b) For some workers, such as women who are coveredby a spouse's
plan, or those who have access to public insuranceprograms, the
value of employer-sponsored medical insurancemay be small or zero.
These workers will also be at the "all wages"corner solution.
c) Given heterogeneity in tastes, there will be some workers who
would like to purchase a different bundle of health insurance than
the one that is offered by their employer.These workers may
choose to consume no health insurance rather thanpurchasing a sub-
optimal bundle.
d) Given a progressive tax schedule, the tax savings involved in
receiving compensation in the form of benefits are smaller for low-
income than for high-income workers.
e) Small companies are less able to take advantage of riskpooling,
and thus are less likely to offer insurance.In fact, in 1993
94.3% of companies with over 50 employees offered health insurance
to at least some of their employees, compared toonly 42.2% of
companies with less than 50 employees (NCHS, 1997).Less-skilled
people are more likely to work for small companies--73.7% of firms
with fewer than 10 employees report that over half of their
employees earned less than $5 per hour or less than $10,000per
year. The comparable figure for firms with over 50 employees was
only 11.1% (NCHS, 1997)
4Selection effects may also account for the fact many firms
exclude part-time workers from coverage and that in the past,
waiting periods for health insurance on new employees were common.
In 1994, 74% of establishments had minimum work hours requirements
for health insurance eligibility and 70.6% had waiting periods for
new employees.The average waiting period was 91 days (NCHS,
1997) .TheHealth Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 guarantees access to an individual health insurance plan
without waiting periods if the employee had 18 months of continuous
coverage previously.It does not however, limit the price that
carriers can charge for this coverage so it is not clear what
effect the law is likely to have on the availability of affordable
employer-provided coverage (GAO, 1997).
In summary, less-skilled workers are less likely to have
employer provided health insurance than other workers because they
are less likely to be offered insurance by their employers; because
they are less likely to purchase health insurance that is offered;
and because they are more likely to have access to public
insurance.
2. Data
Our analysis of the recent evolution of health insurance
coverage will rely on data from three sources: The annual March
Current Population Surveys (CPS) from 1988 to 1997; CPS Benefits
Supplements that were conducted in May 1988, and April 1993 as well
as the CPS Survey of Contingent Work Supplements conducted in
5February 1995 and February 1997; and the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP) covering the years 1989 to 1995.
These data sets have various strengths and weaknesses. The
March CPS are one of the main sources of information aboutchanges
in health insurance over time, since they have includedquestions
about health insurance coverage since 1980.However there are
several issues that complicate analysis of these data.First,
while the questions pertain to health insurance over thepast 12
months, many analysts have concluded that people tend to answer
them as if they referred to contemporaneous or more recent health
insurance status. For example, Shore-Sheppard (1996)compares data
from the 1988 and 1994 waves of the survey to information from the
1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey and the CPS 1993 Benefits
supplement and concludes that the March CPS coverage data can be
interpreted as point-in-time coverage rates as of a window between
December and March.
A more serious problem is that the insurance questions have
been overhauled twice recently, once in 1988 and once in 1995.
Swartz (1997) provides a detailed discussion of the 1995 changes
(as well as some discussion of the 1988 changes).Briefly,the
wording of the questions changed, the ordering of the questions
changed, and new questions about coverage by someone outside the
household were added.3 Swartz argues that the various changes to
In addition, Swartz emphasizes the fact that the sampling
frame of the CPS is changed every 10 years to reflect results from
the most recent Census and that this change also occurred in 1995.
However, since the weights are constantly updated, it seems
unlikely that this change would have a large effect. In fact, the
6the questionnaire are likely to have caused more people torespond
that they had private insurance coverage, Medicaidcoverage, or
military health care (CHMIPUS) .Sincethe number of people without
health insurance is calculated as a residual, these changes would
have caused a reduction in the number of uninsured, other things
being equal.
Trends in health insurance coverage for the entire population
calculated using data from the March CPS are shown in the toppart
of Table 2 for 1987 to 1996. The first column shows the fraction
of the population with health insurance coverage fromany source.
These figures indicate a very gradual increase in the fraction of
people without insurance coverage.The next column shows the
fraction with any private coverage, while the third shows the
fraction with employer-provided health insurance. The difference
between these two columns reflects privately purchased insurance
policies such as Blue Cross/Blue Shield.The fourth and fifth
columns show the fraction of the population covered by their own
employer's health insurance and by a spouse's health insurance,
respectively. Those who have employer-based coverage which is not
their own or their spouses are virtually all children covered under
parent' s policies.
These figures indicate that much of the decline in private
health insurance coverage came from declines in privately purchased
policies, declines in coverage under spousal policies, and
fraction of the population in each state showed onlyvery small
changes between 1994, 1995, and 1996.
7reductions in the coverage of other dependents. These CPS figures
suggest that the fraction of workers covered by insurance from
their own employers actually increased slightly over this period.
Finally, the last column shows a 50% increase in the fraction of
the population covered by Medicaid, the public health insurance
program for low-income women and children.
The 1995 changes to the CPS would have been expected to affect
the numbers calculated for 1994. Table 2 indicates that between
1993 and 1994 the number of people with employer-sponsored health
insurance actually rose 3.4 percentage points, reversing the 1988
to 1993 trend. Although these numbers are not shown here, Swartz
comments that the CPS also shows increases in the number of people
with military coverage despite a decrease in the number of armed
forces personnel.It is likely that these anomalies are due at
least in part to the questionnaire changes.
Further changes to the March CPS health insurance questions,
which affected the 1995 coverage numbers, took effect in 1996.
These included a) the addition of separate questions for privately
purchased, non-employer health insurance such as Blue Cross, b)
questions designed to identify multiple, concurrent sources of
coverage, and c) new questions about health insurance coverage in
the current week.Although the addition of these questions
represents a potentially large improvement in our knowledge of
health insurance coverage, it could have changed respondent's
answers to the old questions in unknown ways.Swartz notes for
example, that according to the CPS, (and as shown in Table 2), the
8fraction of the population covered by Medicaid showed nogrowth
between 1994 and 1995 even though administrative records show
continuing growth in the caseload.
In view of the potential difficulties involved in establishing
trends using the CPS data, we have also analyzed data from the
SIPP. This survey is similar in terms of size and
representativeness to the March CPS, and the health insurance
questions have not changed since 1990. The SIPP is a panelsurvey
in which a new panel is introduced each year. Each household in
the SIPP is interviewed at four month intervals (known as hlwavesu)
for approximately 32 months. We use all the waves from the 1990,
1991, 1992, and 1993 SIPP panels which cover the period from
October 1989 to October 1995. These 4 panels interviewed
approximately 14,300, 14,000, 19,600, and 19,890 households,
respectively. Regression models discussed below correct the
standard errors for the fact that there are repeated observations
on the same households.
The SIPP provides information on the economic, demographic,
and social situation of surveyed household members. Although the
SIPP asks about private health insurance coverage and Medicaid
coverage in every month, it is well known that many respondents
tend to give the same answer for every month within a 4 month
interval (c.f. Blank and Ruggles, 1996).Thuswe examine responses
from January, April, July, and October.
Although the SIPP questions are not as comprehensive as the
latest March CPS questions, they are potentially more useful for
9detecting trends because they remained constant. The SIPP survey
instrument (and data set) contain information about a) whether the
respondent was the primary policy holder of a policy, or was
covered by a policy in someone else's name, b) whether thecoverage
was through a current employer or union, former employer, or other
source (such as the military) ,c)whether the health plan was an
individual or family policy, and d) whether the respondent was
covered by government programs such as Medicaid or Medicare.
These questions on insurance coverage were linked to the work
history topical module (asked in waves 1 or 2 during our sample
period) .Thismodule allows us to construct measures of industry,
occupation, job tenure, firm size (we use firm size at "all
locations"), and union coverage. Tenure and firm size are measured'
inconsistently over time in the March CPS, and the CPS supplements
do not ask about union coverage in a consistent way.
The second half of Table 2 shows population trends in health
insurance coverage calculated using the SIPP.Compared to the
March CPS, the SIPP shows an even more modest decline in rates of
private health insurance coverage and employer provided health
insurance coverage from 1989 to 1993. There is also no sign of the
upswing in coverage after 1993 that was evident in the CPS numbers,
lending support to the idea that this upswing is an artifact of the
changes in the CPS questionnaire.The SIPP shows persistently
higher rates of private health insurance coverage than the CPS,
although the two series become closer after 1993.Thus, to the
extent that the changes in the CPS are thought to have improved
10accuracy, Table 2 suggests that the pre-1994 SIPP numbers are more
accurate than the pre-1994 CPS numbers, although the discrepancies
are generally small.
Since the focus of this paper is on "workers' we have also
recalculated the figures shown in Table 2 for two groups: all
adults age 25 to 64, and all adult workers aged 25 to 64.We
restrict the sample to workers aged 25 to 64 in order to abstract
from college students who may still be covered by their parent's
health insurance. Given the periodicity of the data, workers are
defined differently in the CPS and the SIPP.In the former, a
worker is someone who has worked at least one week in the past
year.In the latter, a worker is someone who has worked in the
past month.The first part of Table 3 indicates that when we
examine all adults, the rates of insurance coverage are quite
similar in the CPS and the SIPP, especially in 1994 and 1995.
However,rates of private health insurance coverage are
consistently higher in the SIPP, while rates of Medicaid coverage
are lower.
The second half of Table 3 shows that the definition of
"worker" is also important.The CPS definition includes more
people with weak labor force attachments, low probabilities of
health insurance coverage, and high probabilities of being covered
by Medicaid. Rates of private health insurance coverage are 4 to
5 percentage points higher in the SIPP and rates of Medicaid
coverage are often 50% lower.
The main message of these tables however, is that one finds
11much less evidence of a decline in private health insurance
coverage in the SIPP than in the March CPS, and that there is
little evidence of decline in either data set after 1993.
The CPS supplements offer a third source of information. The
supplements ask about employer-provided health insurance in the
survey week. They first ask whether the employer offered insurance
to anyone in the firm, and then whether the employee is covered.
If the employee is not covered, he or she is asked the reason.
Employees are also asked about other benefits such as pensions. In
fact, the questions about pension coverage are very similar to
those about health insurance. These supplements include
information about tenure on the job, but like the March CPS, they
suffer from inconsistency in the firm size questions.
A comparison of the numbers in Table 1 with those in Table 3,
suggests that estimates of the fraction of adult workers covered by
their own employer's health insurance are quite similar in the SIPP
and in the supplements, and that both of these sources yield higher
estimates than the March CPS.
A potential drawback to the use of the benefits supplements is
that the 1988 supplement differs slightly from the 1993 supplement,
which in turn is quite different from the 1995 and 1997
supplements. In particular, the 1988 and 1993 supplements first
ask whether a person's employer offered health insurance, then
whether the person was covered (and if not, why not) ,andfinally
whether the person had health insurance from other sources.
Beginning in 1995, the sequence of questions was changed so that
12employees were first asked whether they had any health insurance,
and then whether it was through their employer. If they did not
have insurance through their employer, they were asked whether the
employer offered insurance, whether they were eligible, and why
they were not covered.4 Question wording also varied from year to
year.It is not clear what the net effect of these changes is
likely to have been, but they suggest that one must be cautious
about using these Supplements for trend analyses. The fact that
the trends appear to similar to those in the SIPP offers some
reassurance, however.
The first three panels of Table 4 use the CPS supplements to
explore the reasons for lack of insurance coverage in more detail.
People may be uncovered because they work for an employer who does
not offer coverage to any employees; because they are not eligible
for the coverage that their employer does offer; or because they do
not purchase coverage that they are eligible for.
This discussion follows Farber and Levy (1998) in dividing
In 1988 and 1993 workers were asked: Does your employer
offer a health insurance plan to any of its employees? Areyou
covered by this plan? Why are you not covered by this plan?In
1993, workers were offered more reasons for not being covered and
were also asked: Why were you ineligible or denied coverage? Are
you covered by any health insurance plan not provided by your
employer? Beginning in 1995, workers were asked the following
sequence of questions: Do you have health insurance from any
source? Do you receive this health insurance through your employer?
Does the employer pay for all, part, or none of the insurance
premium? If they did not obtain insurance through their employer
they were asked: How did you obtain your health insurance? Does
your employer offer health insurance to any of its employees? Could
you be in this plan if you wanted to? Why aren't you in this plan?
The range of possible responses to the questions about the reasons
for not being in the plan also varied from previous years.
13workers by education level, but we extend their analysis by also
examining men and women separately. Previous research (c.f. Currie
and Chaykowski, 1995 and Currie, 1997) indicates that gender is an
important determinant of benefits coverage.As Table 4 shows,
there are large gender differences in benefit "offers" and even
greater differences in propensities to take up benefits. Women
also make up the bulk of the part-time workforce, suggesting that
it is useful to distinguish between men and women when analyzing
the effects of part-time status as we will do below.
Table 4 confirms that there have been modest declines in
health insurance coverage among both men and women in the past
decade, and that these declines are slightly larger among less
skilled workers than among skilled workers.5The declines in
coverage among less skilled workers appear to be due to changes in
both "takeup" and eligibility, while among more skilled workers the
changes primarily reflect reductions in takeup.
3. Bad Jobs Getting Worse
In this section, we consider the hypothesis that the declines
in private health insurance coverage among less skilled workers
reflect 'Bad Jobs Getting Worse". The literature on wage
inequality suggests one method of operationalizing the concept of
Our figures for "All" do not match those in Table 1 largely
because we use the 25 to 64 age range while Farber and Levy use all
workers over 20.If we use the same age range as they do, we
calculate that 68.6, 64.3, and 66.5 percent of workers had own-
employer sponsored health insurance in 1988, 1993, and 1997
respectively.
14a "bad job'. This literature finds that among both men and women,
wages for the least skilled workers have been falling in real
terms, while those for the most skilled workers have been
increasing (c.f. Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993; Bernstein and
Mishel, 1997) .Moreover,although wives earnings tend to reduce
income inequality, family income inequality has also been
increasing over time with increases in female headship and higher
returns to college education playing key roles (Cancian and Reed,
1997; Bradbury, 1996). Thus, bad jobs have been getting worse in
the sense that they now pay lower wages than they used to.
As discussed above, if health insurance is a normal good,
people will demand less of it when they are poorer and more of it
when they are richer.Therefore, trends in wages and income
suggest that one might expect to see reductions in private health
insurance coverage among less skilled workers as bad jobs become
worse, but increases in health insurance coverage among more
skilled workers as their good jobs become even better. Instead,
the figures in Table 1 (which were computed by Farber and Levy
using the CPS Supplements) showed that among workers, the decline
in rates of own employer-provided health insurance coverage between
1988 and 1997 was almost as great among college graduates asamong
high school dropouts.
If changes in coverage were driven solely by income effects,
then one might also expect to see similar patterns for other
benefits that are purchased through employers.In Table 4, we
compare trends in own-employer-sponsored health insurance coverage
15to trends in pension coverage for workers with at least some
college education and those without. We focus on this comparison
for two reasons:First, along with health insurance, pension
coverage is one of the costliest and most common components of
benefits packages. Second, people obtain pension coverage through
employers for some of the same reasons that they obtain health
coverage that way--favorable tax treatment, and risk pooling.
In contrast to the trends in health insurance coverage, there
have been increases in the fraction of workers in establishments
that offer pension coverage (except among low-skilled men),andin
the fraction of workers covered. These gains have been
particularly pronounced among college-educated workers.These
trends suggest that changes in health insurance coverage are not
primarily driven by income effects (although changes in pension
coverage may be)
Farber and Levy (1998) interpret "bad jobs" not as jobs held
by less skilled workers but as either part-time or low-tenure jobs.
They break down the overall decline in employer-sponsored health
insurance coverage, into 12 components:First they define four
groups of workers: "old" full-time, "new" full-time, old part-time,
and new part-time. Old workers are those who have been in their
jobs for over a year, while full-time refers to those who usually
work more than 35 hours per week. For each group of workers, they
calculate the share of the decline associated with changes in the
fraction of workers in establishments that offer insurance to some
workers; changes in the fraction of workers in such establishments
16who are eligible for coverage; and changes in the fraction of these
workers who take up coverage. The employment-share weighted sum of
these components over the groups is equal to the overall decline in
insurance coverage.
Using this technique, and the fact that they find virtually no
change in the fraction of workers who are low-tenure or part-time
over the sample period, they calculate that half of the decline in
own-employer-sponsored health insurance coverage is due to changes
in takeup among old full-time workers. Most of the rest is. due to
changes in eligibility for insurance among part-time and new
workers, although these reductions in eligibility appear to be
partially offset by increases in the fraction of such workers in
firms that offer insurance.
The decomposition suggested by Farber and Levy does not allow
us to test the statistical significance of the hypothesized changes
in the effects of worker characteristics on insurance coverage.
Table 5 offers a different look at the effects of low tenure and
full-time status. Part 1 of this table shows coefficient estimates
from regressions of private health insurance variables on
demographic characteristics, indicators for low tenure and fulltime
status, and industry and occupation dummies.
Estimates are shown for each of the four gender/education
groups. Data from the 1988 and 1997 supplements have been pooled,
and interactions are included between the dependent variables and
a dummy variable for 1997. This specification allows us to test
for changes in the coefficients on full-time and low tenure over
17time. Since "bad jobs' may alsohave been getting worse in terms
of other benefits, we also include coefficients from regressions
with pension coverage as the dependent variable.
Table 5 confirms that as Farber and Levy suggest, people who
are working part-time and/or have tenure less than one year are
much less likely to work in places that offer health insurance
coverage. They are also less likely to be eligible for coverage if
their employer has it and are ultimately less likely to have
private health insurance coverage.It is worth noting that low
tenure has almost as great a negative effect on probability of
health insurance coverage as it has on pension coverage.
There is little evidence in Table 5 that the penalty
associated with being a new worker has changed over time. None of
the estimated coefficients on interactions with "low tenure" are
statistically significant. There have been changes in the
importance of full-time employment however.
Among less educated men, there is a significant positive
interaction between full-time and the 1997 dummy for both health
insurance coverage and pension coverage.Among less-educated
women, the advantage of being full-time in terms of health
insurance coverage has actually fallen over time.The relative
improvement in the position of less-educated part-time women
appears to be associated with an increased probability of working
at a firm that offers health insurance coverage. Among more highly
educated women, there have been increases in the probability of
being eligible for health insurance coverage that are associated
18with full-time status.But these changes in eligibility do not
seem to have translated into any change in the probability of
coverage among full-time relative to part-time college-educated
women workers.
Because of our concerns about conducting trend analysesusing
the CPS supplements, we have extended this analysisusing the SIPP.
Part 5 of Table 5 shows estimates from linear probability models in
which own-employer health insurancecoverage is a function of the
variables described above. In addition, we include indicatorsfor
firm size less than 100 workers and unioncoverage. Being in a
large firm and having union coverage can be viewed as additional
indicators of a "good job". These variables are interacted witha
dummy variable equal to one if the year is 1993 or greater.
The main effects of low tenure and fulitimestatus are
qualitatively similar to those reported above, although the effects
of low tenure are much weaker. Being in a larger firmand having
union coverage have large positive effectson the probability of
health insurance coverage. However,very few of the interactions
are statistically significant. The effect of low tenure decreases
slightly over time for more educated men, while the positive effect
of union coverage increases among less educatedmen and women.
In summary, we find that bad jobs are indeed lesslikely to
have benefits coverage. However, we find little evidencethat bad
jobs are getting worse, at least in this respect. It isstriking
that private employer-sponsored health insurancecoverage declined
in the late 1980s and early l990s while the fractionof workers in
19establishments that offer health insurance coverage did not. The
underlying message for policy makers may be that many poor people
will not purchase health insurance coverage even at the subsidized
rate that employers typically offer, and that the cost of health
insurance (which is in turn driven by health care costs),rather
than just whether it is offered or not, is an important factor
determining insurance coverage.
Moreover, while it is often the focus of policy discussions,
it is not clear how meaningful the distinction between offers and
takeup of insurance is from an economic point of view.If the
majority of an employer's workers decline offered coverage, then
the employer may eventually cease to offer the coverage. On the
other hand, if the majority of employees in a firm want health
health insurance coverage and are willing to pay at least the
employer's cost of providing it in the form of reduced wages, then
employer's may begin to offer the benefit. The real question is
not whether employees want health insurance coverage in the
abstract, but whether, given their budget constraint, they demand
health insurance at the price that the employer is willing to
provide it.
4. Crowdout
Table 2 showed that much of the decline in private health
insurance coverage was coming from declines in the number of people
purchasing non-employment based health insurance and reductions in
the coverage of spouses and dependents under employer-provided
20policies.Table 4 suggested that fewer people were taking up
offered coverage than in the late 1980s.
A possible reason for these trends is that public health
insurance for women and children under the Medicaid program became
much more generous over this period. As discussed above, people
will be less likely to purchase health insurance through their
employers when alternative sources of health insurance become more
attractive.The period of greatest expansion of the Medicaid
program corresponds with the period of most rapid decline of
employer-based health insurance coverage (as shown in Table 1)
Thus, it is natural to suspect that the two phenomena are linked,
and that public insurance has crowded out private health insurance.
The Medicaid expansions have been discussed extensively
elsewhere (c.f. Yelowitz, 1995; Currie and Gruber, l996a; Currie
and Gruber, 1996b; Cutler and Gruber, 1996). Briefly, a series of
federal laws first gave states the option, and then required them
to raise the income-eligibility thresholds for Medicaid coverage of
pregnant women, and various age-groups of children. Because states
started with very different levels of generosity to begin with and
took up these federal options at different rates, there was a great
deal of variation in income cutoffs both across states and within
states over time which can be used to identify the effects of the
expansions. By April 1990, states were required to cover children
up to age six in families with incomes up to 133% of the federal
poverty line. Moreover, effective July 1991, states were required
to cover all children under age 19 (born after Sept. 30, 1983)
21whose family incomes were less than 100% of poverty.By 1992,
states were also required to cover all pregnant women (from the
date of verification of pregnancy) with incomes less than 133% of
poverty. Many states have also chosen to extend coverage of these
groups further, using state-only funds.
As Tables 2 and 3 showed, Medicaid coverage has increased
while the prevalence of employer-sponsored health insurance
coverage has fallen. While these figures are suggestive, they do
not prove that the relationship between increases in Medicaid
coverage and decreases in private health insurance coverage was
causal.We have already observed that the declining trend in
private health insurance coverage predates the Medicaid expansions.
Shore-Sheppard (1996) observes that there were increases in
reported Medicaid coveage, and decreases in private health
insurance coverage even among single, childless males, a group that
one would not expect to have been greatly affected by the Medicaid
expansions to pregnant women and children.
Nevertheless, most observers agree that crowdout exists,
although the magnitude of the measured effect has been the subject
of debate (c.f. Cutler and Gruber, 1996, 1997; Shore-Sheppard,
1996, 1997; Dubay and Kenney, 1997; Yazici and Kaestner, 1998).
The measured effect of crowdout depends on several factors:
a) How crowdout is defined. Cutler and Gruber (1996) conclude that
3.5 million people gained public coverage and 1.7 million lost
private health insurance coverage as a direct result of Medicaid
22expansions that occurred between 1987 and 1992. Dubay and Kenney
calculate that the reduction in private insurance coverage as a
share of the total increase in Medicaid enrollments was 22%. This
number is lower than Cutler and Gruber's estimate because much of
the increase in Medicaid coverage over the period was among people
who would have been eligible even in the absence of the Medicaid
expansions. Shore-Sheppard (1996) asks what fraction of the total
decline in private insurance coverage over the 1987 to 1992 period
resulted from the Medicaid expansions? Since employer-sponsored
insurance coverage was declining even among those who were
ineligible for the expansions, this figure is only 15%.All of
these studies were based on data from the March CPS.
b) What period crowdout is measured over.In a revision of her
earlier work, Shore-Sheppard (1997) finds that adding the years
1994 to 1996 to her time period doubles her estimate of the extent
of crowdout from 15 to 30%.One should expect estimates of
crowdout to be sensitive to the sample period for several reasons.
First, as the generosity of public insurance increases, the
composition of newly eligible households changes. Covering the
poorest households will not cause crowdout because most of these
families do not have the option of purchasing private employer-
sponsored health insurance to begin with. At the other end of the
spectrum, relatively well-off families with insurance that is
superior to Medicaid will be unlikely to make the switch.
A second related issue is that families who do not know that
23they are eligible for Medicaid will not drop private health
insurance coverage in order to take up publiccoverage. The
evidence suggests that although in 1994 and 1995, 39% of births
were paid for by Medicaid, many women did not take advantage of the
free prenatal care provided by the program (NGA, 1997; Ellwood and
Kenney, 1995) .Apossible reason is that they did not learn of
their eligibility until they arrived at the hospital to deliver.
c) The Data Source. Most of the work on crowdout to date has been
conducted using the March CPS. Given that both the levels and the
trends in health insurance coverage are sensitive to theway these
questions are asked, it is not surprising that the use of slightly
different extracts from the CPS generate different answers.
Part 6 of Table 5 shows coefficients from models of the
probability of Medicaid coverage estimated using SIPP data.6 The
models follow the same format as the others in Table 5.These
estimates show that the probability of Medicaidcoverage is higher
for part-time, low tenure, non-union workers.Firm size has a
significant effect for less-educated women.The interactions
indicate that full-time status had a less negative effecton
coverage among less educated male and female workers over time,
while the effect of being a low tenure workergrew among less
6 We did not conduct thisanalysis using the CPS supplements
because we were unable to calculate reasonable looking trends in
Medicaid coverage using these data (i.e. coverage fell between 1988
and 1993 instead of increasing)
24educated workers and female workers with over 12 years of
education.
These patterns suggest that among both men and women, more low
tenure and full-time workers were becoming covered by Medicaid over
time. The finding that men as well as women were gaining Medicaid
coverage replicates Shore-Sheppard's results and suggests that the
Medicaid expansions to women and children may have been accompanied
by other (so far unremarked) measures that made Medicaid coverage
more accessible to men.
We also use the regressions underlying Table 5 to test for
whether the coefficients on marital status, the number of children,
and the presence of children of different age groups in the
household have changed over time in a manner consistent with the
crowdout hypothesis. The coefficients from regressions with
coverage as the dependent variable are shown in Table 6.As in
Table 5, the first part of the table shows estimates from
regressions based on the CPS supplements, while the second part
shows estimates based on the SIPP.
The first part of the table contains one suggestive finding
for less educated women: In 1988, these women were 14% more likely
to have health insurance coverage through their employers if they
had an infant in the household. By 1997, however, this effect had
been entirely wiped out.This finding is echoed in the models
estimated using S1PP data, although the size of the effects is much
smaller. Given that infants whose deliveries are paid for by the
Medicaid program are covered for one year after delivery, and that
2540% of births are now paid for by Medicaid, we might expect the
strongest crowding out among infants of less skilled workers.
In the CPS supplements, the negative effect of marital status
on the probability of health insurance coverage became more
negative over time for all four groups, but the coefficients are
larger for the more educated than for the less educated. Hence,
this finding is more suggestive of households economizing by
eliminating duplicative coverage than of crowdout. In the SIPP,
the effects of marriage are qualitatively similar, but the
interaction terms are not statistically significant except for
college-educated men.
These considerations suggest that while crowdout is important,
it obviously cannot account for the entire downward trend in
private employer-sponsored health insurance coverage over the past
two dedades.
5. Changes in the Price of Health Insurance
The simplest economic explanation for a decline in the number
of people purchasing a product is that its price has gone up.
Cutler and Sheiner (1997, page 1) note that "After decades of
double-digit increases,health insurance cost growth has
essentially ground to a halt". Data on costs of health insurance
by region is available from private surveys prpduced by Foster
Higgins and Co., Inc. and more recently by William M. Mercer, Inc.
26(see the description in Meyer and Rosenbaum, 1998) .
Thesedata indicate that employer contributions for health
insurance doubled or tripled in all regions of thecountry over the
1984 to 1991 period.However, after 1991, these contributions
leveled off and began to fall. The same pattern holds in terms of
the premiums that employees actually paid. For example, in the
Pacific states, premiums for family coverage rose from $1613 in
1984 to $4372 in 1991.8 However, between 1992 and 1996 family
premiums in the Western states fell from $4828 to $4749. As we
have seen, the long decline in rates of private health insurance
coverage also seems to have leveled off in the early l990s, which
suggests that this trend is related to the trend in costs.9
It is difficult to get the price data necessary to estimate
the elasticity of demand for health insurance. Studies such as the
We thank Bruce Meyer for bringing these data to our
attention. The data before 1993 is based on a convenience sample
of Foster-Higgins clients, whereas the data after 1993 is basedon
a sample of large firms. Another difference between the 1991 and
1992 data is that before 1992 data is reported for 7 regions
whereas after 1992, it is reported for only 4. Many assumptions
are needed to derive a useable time-series from these surveys.
These are discussed in an Appendix to Meyer and Rosenbaum (1998)
8 O'Brien and Feder (1998) cite thisrun-up in costs as the
reason for the decline in private health insurance coverage among
low wage workers, but does not offer a direct test of this
hypothesis.
However, the decline in private health insurance coverage
has been very gradual relative to the rapidrun-up in health care
costs. This may be due to the fact that health care costs increase
both the costs of insurance, and the value of insurance.Moreover,
the value of health insurance is likely to increase most rapidly
for those who have assets to lose in the event of a health shock,
suggesting that the poor may be most likely to respond to increases
in health care costs by dropping health insurancecoverage.
27RAND Health Insurance experiment focus on the demand for health
care where the treatment is the type of insurance policy.
Moreover, the employee's choice of insurance is complicated by the
fact that it is only one element of a bundle of goods that is
chosen when he or she accepts employment at one firm rather than
another. Hence, even if we knew what each employee actually paid
for his or her health insurance, we would have to treat this as an
endogenous variable. An additional problem is that there is good
reason to believe that the quality of health insurance has been
changing over time as traditional fee-for-service plans have been
replaced with managed care, or altered to include larger co-
payments. Thus, people buying health insurance are not purchasing
the same good today as they were purchasing 10 years ago.
One option we explored was using state-level variation in the
costs of health care and in the fraction of firms offering health
insurance to try to identify the effects of health care costs. The
National Center for Health Statistics (1997) reports that the
fraction of firms offering health insurance varies widely from
state to state. The rate approaches 55 to 60% in states such as
Delaware and Pennsylvania, but is closer to 30% in states like
Mississippi and Arkansas. State-level data about expenditures on
medical care in 1985, 1990, and 1992 is available from Levit et al.
(1997)
We examined the relationship between state-to-state variations
in medical expenditures (measured using personal health care
expenditures as a percent of gross state product) and in the
28probability of private health insurance coverage, eligibility, and
offers. The results indicated that there are negative correlations
between state-level health care expenditures, eligibility and
coverage. However, adding year dummies to the models reduced all
of the correlations to statistical insignificance suggesting that
it is the time trend in the expenditure data that is correlated
with employer-provided health insurance, rather than the cross-
state variation in these expenditures. A more satisfactory
examination of the relationship between health care costs and
private health insurance coverage awaits better data.
6. Health Insurance for Single Mothers
Single mothers are of particular concern to policy makers in
this era of welfare reform.This section examines trends in
employer and state-provided health insurance coverage for this
group.These trends may shed additional light on the crowdout
issue, since the health insurance options facing single mothers
have been significantly affected by the Medicaid expansions.
Trends in health insurance coverage by education and
employment status are shown in Table 7 for both the SIPP and the
March CPS data. There are some important discrepancies between the
two data sets.For example, if we focus on all less-educated
mothers, the CPS data suggest that there was a modest increase in
Medicaid coverage between 1989 and 1993 which was almost entirely
offset by a decrease in private health insurance coverage.
However, the decline in private coverage came not from employer-
29provided coverage but from other types of private policies.In
contrast, the SIPP shows a much larger increase in Medicaid
coverage, which was only partially offset by declining private
coverage.
The CPS also suggests that there was an 8 percentage point
increase in Medicaid coverage among college-educated mothers and an
offsetting decrease in private health insurance coverage. The SIPP
shows little trend in either of these series.These results
suggest that estimates of the extent of crowdout may be sensitive
to the data that are used to calculate them.
Turning to single mothers who were employed at some point in
the past year (CPS) or month (SIPP), we found that their rates of
private insurance coverage are very similar to those of all
employed women, conditional on educational attainment (though this
comparison is not shown) .Thus,the lower rates of private
insurance coverage among single mothers as a whole reflect lower
probabilities of employment rather than inferior benefits for those
who are employed.
Regardless of the data set used, Table 7 indicates that
Medicaid is a very important source of health insurance coverage
for single mothers, and that it has increased in importance in
recent years. Given that many single mothers first gain access to
Medicaid through welfare, it is interesting to ask what happens to
this coverage when women leave the welfare rolls.
Several state-specific studies of this issue are cited in
Moffitt and Slade (1997)These studies estimate that between 25%
30and 50% of women who leave welfare have no health insurance two or
three years later. Moffitt and Slade use a nationally
representative sample of young mothers from the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth to look at the health insurance
coverage of women and children, one, two, and three years after
they left welfare.
They find that the fraction covered by employer-provided plans
rose from 23% of mothers and 21% of children in the first year to
38% of mothers and 47% of children in the third year. By the third
year, 69% of the mothers were working but about one-half of those
who were covered by employer-provided insurance were covered by a
spouse's plan. About half of the women and children are covered by
Medicaid in the first year, but this fraction declines to 16% of
women and 33% of children after three years. At this point, over
40% of the mothers are uninsured as well as 12% of the children.
We have conducted a similar analysis using the SIPP.An
advantage of the SIP? is that is possible to determine precisely
when people exited AFDC, and what their insurance status is a
specific number of months later. A disadvantage is that the SIPP
panels are short, so it is difficult to follow women exiting
welfare for a long period of time. We therefore look at insurance
status 6 months and 12 months after exiting welfare. We use all
available observations at each point in time.Restricting the
sample to those who were still in the panel after 12 months (many
women exit the survey between 6 months and 12 months after leaving
welfare) did not materially affect our estimates.
31The results are shown in Table 8.In the year following
welfare exit, the fraction covered by private health insurance
rises, while the fraction with Medicaid coverage falls. Compared
to Moffitt and Slade, we find a much higher fraction of women and
children with private health insurance coverage after one year, and
a lower fraction reporting Medicaid coverage. The net effect is a
slightly larger number of uninsured. If we break women into those
who remain single and those who marry (since many women leave AFDC
through marriage) ,wesee that the fraction with private coverage
is higher among those who are married, while the fraction with
Medicaid coverage is lower.The fraction with any coverage is
almost the same in the two groups, however.
Turning to the children, Table 8 shows that the fraction with
private coverage is relatively invariant to age, while the fraction
with Medicaid coverage falls with age. This pattern is what one
would expect given the more generous rules governing the Medicaid
eligibility of young children. We also looked for trends over time
in the fraction of women and children gaining private insurance
and/or retaining Medicaid after one year, but were unable to
identify any definite pattern.
Together these numbers suggest that for a significant fraction
of women on welfare, loss of cash benefits is likely to be followed
by loss of health insurance for both themselves and their children.
Data that will enable us to make definitive statements about the
effects of time-limited welfare benefits on health insurance
coverage are not yet available. However, in Wisconsin and two
32other states with aggressive programs to get people off welfare,
Medicaid enrollments have dropped by 40 to 50% among those who have
been forced off the roles. This is despite the fact that under the
new Medicaid rules, most of the children remain eligible.The
problem seems to be that neither welfare recipients nor their case
workers know about the Medicaid expansions (Rubin,1997).
Greenberg (1998) offers a summary of several state 1exit1 studies
and concludes that one-third or more of the children and most of
the adults in families who exit from the new Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families program are without health insurance "some
months'after leaving. Knowledge about increases in eligibility is
likely to increase over time with consequent increases in both the
fraction of former welfare recipients who retain Medicaid benefits,
and in possibilities for crowdout.
7. Discussion and Conclusion
We began this research with the belief that the decline in
private-employer sponsored health insurance was a continuing
problem, especially among less skilled workers. But, our analysis
paints a more complex picture. Rates of employer-sponsored health
insurance coverage are sensitive to the way that insurance
questions are posed, to the way that "workers" are defined, and to
the age range of workers examined.Regardless of these data
problems, however, we find that in recent years the decline in
private employer-sponsored health insurance coverage has slowed,
and may even have reversed.
33Neither crowdout, nor a deterioration in the quality of jobs
available to the less skilled seems likely to fully explain recent
time-series trends in health insurance coverage. A simple
explanation that has been overlooked is that rising health care
costs have driven much of the reduction in private health insurance
coverage, but it is difficult to test this hypothesis given the
available data.
Three factors suggest that employer-sponsored health insurance
coverage could begin to decline again in future.First, the
increase in wage inequality that began in the l970s is continuing
into the l990s with the result that there are more relatively low
wage workers than ever.Although past patterns in benefits
coverage do not appear to have been driven primarily by income
effects, the "bad jobs getting worse" phenomena could become more
important in future.
Moreover, if time limits on welfare are effective, they will
push many less skilled women into the work force, again increasing
the number of less skilled workers (see Moffitt's discussion in
this volume) .Ifpast experience is any guide, many of these women
and children are likely to lose health insurance within a few years
of losing their welfare benefits.
Second, crowdout is likely to become more important over time,
as more people become aware of the public insurance option.In
addition to outreach campaigns, administrative changes designed to
make Medicaid more accessible have also been undertaken recently in
many states. However, little is known about their effects.
34Growing knowledge about the Medicaid alternative may interact with
rising health care costs and the falling relative wages of less-
skilled workers to increase crowdout.
In view of the attention that has been paid to the Medicaid
expansions to pregnant women and children, the fact that Medicaid
enrollments have been rising for men as well as women is
surprising. A possible explanation is that states have made less
heralded changes to their programs that have made it easier for men
as well as women and children to receive benefits.This issue
deserves further investigation.
Third, although health care costs stopped rising in the early
l990s, this may prove to be a mere hiatus.Cutler and Sheiner
(1997) point out that much of the cost-savings arising from the
introduction of managed care and hospital reorganization have
already been realized, and that technological change is the
underlying force driving health care costs.In fact, there are
suggestions that health care costs have already begun to rise
again. A recent survey of 213 firms found that health care costs
were expected to rise 7% in 1999, the first major rise in the 1990s
(Armour, 1999) .Moreover,if consumers perceive that managed care
plans are of lower quality than fee-for-service plans, then
quality-adjusted costs of care may be rising at an even greater
rate.
Although the value of health insurance increases with health
care costs, a future run-up in costs could drive many families to
the point where the cost of insurance becomes prohibitive. Further
35research on the link between health insurance costs and coverage is
certainly warranted.
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39Table 1: Percent Private Sector Workers Covered
by Own Employer's Insurance
Source: Farber and Levy, 1998
All College Some High <High
Graduates College School School
May1979 71.9 80.6 71.3 71.4 67.3
May1988 69.1 81.9 68.0 67.2 57.8
April 1993 64.7 77.4 63.8 62.7 47.1
Feb. 1997 64.5 76.0 63.2 61.6 50.2
Note: These numbers were calculated using the CPS Supplements.
40Table 2: Trends in Health Insurance Coverage
in the March CPS and in the SIPP
Source: March CPS
TypeCoverage: Employer Own Spouse
AnyPrivateProvided Employer Employer Medicaid
1987 87.1 75.5 62.2 31.6 11.4 7.9
1988 86.6 74.7 62.0 31.8 11.3 8.0
1989 86.4 74.6 61.8 31.8 11.1 8.0
1990 86.1 73.2 60.6 31.3 11.0 9.0
1991 85.9 72.1 59.8 30.9 11.0 9.7
1992 85.0 71.1 58.5 30.0 10.8 10.0
1993 84.7 70.2 57.1 30.7 9.4 11.0
1994 84.8 70.3 60.5 32.0 10.0 12.1
1995 84.6 70.3 60.6 32.1 10.0 12.1
1996 84.4 70.2 60.7 32.1 10.1 11.8
Source: SIPP
Type Coverage: Employer Own Spouse
Any PrivateProvided Employer Employer Medicaid
1989 86.5 76.1 65.2 32.0 12.2 6.7
1990 87.0 75.7 64.8 32.3 11.9 7.8
1991 87.0 74.4 64.0 31.9 11.8 8.8
1992 86.4 73.3 63.0 30.9 11.7 9.5
1993 85.8 71.9 62.0 30.4 11.5 10.5
1994 86.0 71.7 62.1 30.6 11.5 11.0
1995 86.5 72.0 62.7 31.1 11.6 11.4
Notes: In contrast to Table 1 which is based on only private sector
workers, the sample for this table includes the entire population. The
dotted lines indicate the date of the change in the March CPS
questionnaires. The 1995 changes would have been expected to affect
the rates for 1994.
41Table 3: Trends in Health Insurance Coverage Among Adults and Workers
Notes: See Table 2.
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85.3Table 4: Own-Employer Benefits Among
Private Sector Workers, 25-64
All <=12Years Ed. At Least
Some College
Men Women Men Women
Health Offered
1988 .83 .83 .76 .90 .85
1993 .82 .78 .75 .90 .84
1997 .84 .81 .76 .91 .86
Eligible for HI
1988 .80 .81 .69 .88 .80
1993 .78 .75 .69 .88 .78
1997 .79 .77 .68 .88 .79
Health Coverage
1988 .71 .75 .57 .83 .66
1993 .67 .68 .54 .80 .63
1997 .69 .72 .55 .81 .65
Pension Offered
1988 .64 .63 .56 .72 .66
1993 .65 .58 .56 .75 .70
1997 .67 .61 .56 .76 .72
Pension Coverage
1988 .51 .54 .41 .60 .46
1993 .52 .49 .41 .62 .51
1997 .55 .51 .42 .66 .55
Notes: Source is the CPS Supplements. Means from 1995 are not shown as
they are generally very similar to 1997.Means of eligibility and
coverage are not conditional on being offered the benefit. The sample
excludes non-workers and those in the military and public sectors. All
means are weighted using the supplement weights.
43Table 5
Coefficients on "Full-time" and "Low Tenure" from Regressions of
Own-Employer Health Insurance Offers, Eligibility, and Coverage
Women Men




























R-squared .166 .145 .130
* Obs. 9,124 9,935 9,639



























































































































































Notes: Source is the CPS Supplements for May 1988 and Feb. 1997, and the
SIPP (all years).Models were estimated separately for each group
indicated in the columnheadings.Models also included demographic
variables, industry, and occupation as described inthetext.The
sample consists of workers aged 25-64 and excludes those in the
military, those in the public sector, and those with missing data.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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B: Source=SIPP
5. Deoendent Variable=Covered by Employer's HealthInsurance
Full—time .274 .243 .343 .296
(.007) (.010) (.009) (.012)
Full—time x 1993+ .011 .022 —.003 - .006
(.009) (.013) (.011) (.016)
Low Tenure -.097 - .120 -.081 - .097
(.007) (.008) (.008) (.008)
Low Tenure x 1993+ .013 — .003 - .002 — .034
(.011) (.014) (.014) (.016)
Firmsize <100 —.171 — .131 - .161 - .117
(.008) (.007) (.008) (.007)
Firmsize <100 .001 — .000 —.008 —.010
x 1993+ (.010) (.009) (.011) (.010)
Union .201 .211 .158 .148
(.009) (.005) (.011) (.007)
Union x 1993+ .023 .025 .018 .014
(.012) (.007) (.015) (.008)
R—squared .306 .250 .297 .174
#Obs 146,218160,552 124,671147,309
6. Dependent Variable=Medicaid
— .032 — .011 - .011 Full—time —.032
(.003) (.005) (.002) (.003)
Full—time x 1993+ -.008 — .022 — .003 - .003
(.004) (.007) (.003) (.004)
Low Tenure .032 .010 .014 .004
(.004) (.002) (.002) (.001)
Low Tenure x 1993+ .027 .017 .022 .007
(.007) (.006) (.006) (.004)
Firmsize <100 .007 .001 .002 .000
(.003) (.002) (.002) (.001)
Firmsize <100 —.004 .002 .005 .001
x 1993+ (.004) (.002) (.002) (.001)
Union —.011 - .006 - .006 — .002
(.003) (.001) (.003) (.001)
Union x 1993+ —.002 —.003 —.002 .001
(.005) (.002) (.003) (.002)
R—squared .088 .034 .055 .011
#Obs 146,218160,552 124,671147,309Table 6
Coefficients on Family Structure Variables from Regressions of
Employer-Provided Health Coverage
A: Source=CPS Supplements
<=12Years Ed. At LeastSome College

















Children -.028 -.010 —.021 .012
. (.017) (.014) (.019) (.013)








Any child <1 .138 .035 - .024 .020
(.054) (.035) (.047) (.030)
Any child <1 x 97 —.141 —.042 .081 — .025
(.071) (.045) (.055) (.037)
Any child 1—4 .036 .012 —.024 —.011
(.031) (.025) (.033) (.023)
Any child 1-4 x 97 -.037 —.062 .053 .005
(.040) (.032) (.038) (.028)
Any child 5—10 .014 .028 — .016 — .008
(.028) (.024) (.032) (.024)
Any child 5—10 x 97 —.021 —.033 .052 — .017
(.037) (.031) (.037) (.029)
Any child 11+ .008 .014 —.042 -.009
(.029) (.024) (.033) (.024)
Any child 11+ x 97 —.045 —.030 .033 —.007
(.037) (.031) (.039) (.029)
R—squared .261 .212 .272 .155



































Any child <1 .025 —.017 .022 .007
(.013) (.035) (.014) (.010)
Any child <1 x 93+ -.031 .002 .016 —.019
(.018) (.015) (.020) (.014)
Any child 1—4 -.011 .012 — .006 .002
(.010) (.025) (.012) (.009)
Any child 1—4 x 93+ -.001 —.027 .008 .017
(.013) (.009) (.016) (.013)
46Table 6, continued
Any child 5-10
Any child 5-10 x 93+
Any child 11+
Any child 11+ x 93+
R- squared
# Obs.
Notes: See Table 5.
— .024 .001 —.023 .006
(.009) (.008) (.010) (.008)
.008 —.011 .001 .009
(.012) (.011) (.014) (.011)
— .038 —.004 —.028 — .002
(.010) (.009) (.012) (.010)
— .011 .013
—.010 — .001
(.014) (.013) (.016) (.013)
.306 .250 .297 .174
146,218160,552 124,671147,309
47Table 7: Trends in Health Insurance Coverage xnong Single Mothers
Notes: The dotted lines indicate the date of the change inthe March
CPS questionnaires.The 1995 changes would have been expected to
affect the rates for 1994.
48
Less than 12 Years Ed.
Type Coverage: Employer
Private Provided Medicaid
Source: March CPS, All 25-64




1987 40.8 32.5 39.7 73.1 62.3 15.1
1988 42.2 34.6 38.8 72.4 61.0 15.6
1989 43.7 36.9 35.3 72.0 59.9 15.0
1990 38.6 33.0 40.4 71.2 59.4 16.9
1991 37.1 31.6 43.1 67.2 57.9 19.5
1992 35.8 31.2 42.7 64.4 53.7 21.1
1993 36.3 31.5 43.4 65.8 55.7 23.2
1994 37.2 32.9 39.3 63.7 56.4 22.4
1995 36.1 31.8 40.0 64.0 54.6 21.2
1996 37.2 32.9 39.3 66.4 57.9 19.3
Source:MarchCPS,Workersonly, 25-64
86.5 77.0 2.0 1987 68.9 58.8 8.7
1988 67.2 59.0 9.0 83.2 72.4 2.6
1989 66.8 58.8 9.1 82.6 73.9 3.6
1990 63.3 56.1 10.9 82.3 73.7 3.5
1991 62.7 55.9 11.5 82.0 72.9 4.4
1992 60.9 54.4 11.3 82.0 5.3
1993 60.7 52.6 13.0 81.2 72.6 4.7
1994 60.3 54.5 12.5 76.1 69.9 6.1
1995 60.0 54.2 12.4 77.5 70.9 5.8
1996 59.0 52.8 14.5 79.4 72.4 6.0
Source:SIPP, All 25-64
47.3 42.4 28.1 68.6 60.4 15.4 1989
1990 47.6 42.0 31.1 73.0 67.0 11.5
1991 46.3 40.8 33.5 72.2 66.7 12.6
1992 44.8 39.9 34.8 70.6 64.4 13.1
1993 42.7 38.3 37.5 67.2 61.3 15.7
1994 43.1 39.5 38.3 68.1 61.9 16.6
1995 41.2 37.8 40.0 69.9 64.3 16.8
Source:SIPP, Workers Only,25-64
3.5 84.5 76.6 2.8 1989 67.4 63.3
1990 69.2 64.0 8.8 82.7 79.2 2.9
1991 69.1 64.6 10.0 81.3 77.1 4.5
1992 67.1 63.5 11.4 81.1 4.3
1993 65.9 62.3 12.2 78.3 74.2 5.9
1994 66.0 63.0 13.1 78.9 74.6 7.7
1995 64.3 62.4 12.5 78.1 74.1 8.9Table 8
Health Insurance Coverage for Women and Children Leaving Welfare
After 6 Months After 1 Year Obs.
Private Medicaid Private Medicaid 6 months1 year
Mothers
All 33.4 42.2 40.4 32.3 1283 762
Single 29.0 46.3 36.7 37.5 834 477
Married 41.6 34.5 46.7 24.6 449 285
Children
All 31.0 52.7 39.0 45.9 2679 1510
<6 33.4 61.2 39.6 55.4 872 455
>=6 30.0 48.5 38.8 41.8 1807 1055
49